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CORPUS

HABEAS

Does the AEDPA Apply to a Habeas Petition
Filed After an Exhaustion
of State Remedies?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 313-317. © 2000 American Bar Association.
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ISSUE
If a person's petition for habeas corpus is dismissed for failure to
exhaust state remedies, and the person then exhausts his state remedies and refiles the petition, are the
claims within that petition that
were not included in the initial filing "second or successive" habeas
applications?
FACTS
In 1989, 19-year-old Antonio T.
Slack was charged with first-degree
murder of 12-year-old Alanna
Holmes, who had died from a single,
close-range shot in the neck. Slack
turned himself in to police soon
after the shooting because he was
having nightmares about seeing
Holmes die. At the trial, Slack
admitted that he had shot Holmes
but claimed that the killing was
accidental. The jury convicted Slack
of second-degree murder. The court
sentenced him to life imprisonment
in the Nevada State Prison and
imposed a consecutive life sentence
because he had used a deadly
weapon in connection with the
killing.

Slack appealed his conviction to the
Nevada Supreme Court, claiming
that there was insufficient evidence
adduced at his trial to convict him,
that state law improperly allowed
evidence of Slack's sexual relationship with the victim, that the jury
instruction regarding reasonable
doubt was improper, and that the
trial court erred by not adequately
defining premeditation in the jury
instruction.
After his appeal was dismissed by
the Nevada Supreme Court in 1991,
Slack, representing himself, filed a
petition for a Section 2254 writ of
habeas corpus in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nevada.
Slack contended that insufficient
evidence was adduced at trial to
convict him of second-degree murder, that the trial court improperly
allowed prejudicial evidence of a
sexual relationship between Slack
and the 12-year-old victim, that the
reasonable doubt instruction violat(Continued on Page 314)
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ed the due process clause of the
Constitution, and that the trial
court had erred in not adequately
defining premeditation in the jury
instructions regarding murder.
Slack later moved to stay the proceedings on his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus so that he could
pursue post-conviction relief proceedings in the Nevada state courts.
Included in the motion was a list
of unexhausted issues, not contained in his initial filing, that Slack
proposed to exhaust during the
state court habeas corpus proceedings. The district court dismissed
this petition without prejudice so
that Slack could exhaust his state
remedies.
In July 1992, Slack, again representing himself, filed a petition for postconviction relief in a Nevada state
court. In his petition, Slack alleged
he had been denied his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to
the effective assistance of trial counsel in that his counsel (1) failed to
find out what kind of deal was made
with co-defendant Kamal Bey; (2)
failed to file a pretrial motion in
limine to stop the introduction of
prior evidence regarding Slack's sexual relationship with the victim; (3)
failed to file a pretrial motion in
limine to stop the testimony of Bey,
as Bey's plea bargain with the prosecution was contingent on his trial
testimony; (4) failed to interview
Slack's brother to refute the testimony of Bey; (5) failed to ask Bey
what deals he had made with the
state for his testimony; (6) failed to
request an accomplice instruction;
(7) failed to have evidence presented to the jury that the only fingerprints found on the murder weapon
were those of Bey; and (8) that
these alleged errors prejudiced him.
Slack also claimed that he had been
denied effective appellate counsel in
that counsel on appeal to the

Nevada Supreme Court (1) failed to
raise a violation of state law relating
to testimony by a co-defendant; (2)
failed to raise the issue that counsel
failed to request an accomplice
instruction; (3) failed to raise the
issue that Bey was a co-defendant
and that his testimony was questionable; and (4) failed to raise an
issue of prosecutorial misconduct
when the prosecutor failed to
inform the jury that Bey was a codefendant as well as of the fact that
Bey's fingerprints were the only fingerprints found on the murder
weapon. The Nevada trial court
denied the petition and the Nevada
Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal in December 1993.
In 1995, Slack filed a Section 2254
petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in federal court, containing the
same claims Slack had presented in
the Nevada courts as well as the
issues raised in the 1991 filing. After
counsel was appointed to represent
Slack, an amended petition was filed
on Dec. 24, 1997. This amended
petition alleged (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction; (2) there was insufficient
notice provided by the charging
documents; (3) there was improper
introduction of Slack's sexual relationship with the victim; (4) the
court failed to instruct the jury
properly on (a) reasonable doubt,
(b) premeditation and deliberation,
and (c) malice aforethought; (5)
there was ineffective assistance of
trial; (6) there was ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and (7)
there was cumulative error.
The State of Nevada moved to dismiss grounds 2, 3, 4(c), 5, 6, and 7,
alleging that Slack had failed completely to exhaust his state remedies. The State also argued that
grounds 2, 4(c), 5, 6, and 7 were not
raised in Slack's first federal petition
and constituted an abuse of the writ
of habeas corpus.
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On March 13, 1998, the district
court entered an order dismissing
grounds 2, 4(c), 5, 6, and 7 as "abusive" under Farmerv. McDaniel, 98
F.3d 1548 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1188 (1997), since
they had not been raised in Slack's
first federal petition. The court also
found that ground 3 of Slack's petition was unexhausted and therefore
dismissed his petition.
The district court gave Slack the
option of reopening the proceeding
and abandoning his claim on ground
3 if he wished to continue in federal
court with the remaining, exhausted
claims. Rather than proceeding with
the remaining, exhausted claims,
Slack filed a notice of appeal. In
May 1998, the district court denied
Slack's application for a certificate
of probable cause to appeal. On July
7, 1998, a two-judge panel of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit summarily denied Slack's
request for a certificate of probable
cause. On Feb. 22, 1999, the
Supreme Court granted Slack's petition for a writ of certiorari.
After briefing and oral argument,
the Supreme Court ordered supplemental briefing and oral argument
on the following issues:
1. Do the provisions of the
Antiterrorist and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA), specifically
including 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), control the
proceedings on appeal?
2. If the AEDPA does control the
proceedings on appeal, may a certificate of appealability issue under
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)?
CASE ANALYSIS
The writ of habeas corpus provides
a means by which the legal authority under which a person is detained
can be challenged. A writ of habeas
corpus may be used to re-examine
federal constitutional issues even

3 Issue No. 6

after trial and review by the state
courts. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953). By means of a writ of
habeas corpus, a federal court may
order the discharge of any person
held by a state in violation of the
federal Constitution or laws. See 28
U.S.C. § 2241(e)(3).
A state prisoner is ordinarily not
able to obtain a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court unless the
prisoner has exhausted the remedies available in state court. Ex
parte RoyaUl, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
The exhaustion requirement gives
the state an initial opportunity to
pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.
See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S.
254, 257 (1986). This requirement
was put in statutory form in 1948 in
28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("An application
for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court shall
not be granted unless it appears ...
the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of
the State.")
In Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509
(1982), the Supreme Court adopted
a "total exhaustion" rule requiring a
district court to dismiss petitions
containing grounds on which the
petitioner has exhausted state remedies and other grounds on which
the state remedies are not exhausted. However, the Court stated that
prisoners who submit such "mixed
petitions" nevertheless are entitled
to resubmit a petition with only
exhausted claims or to exhaust the
remainder of their claims. Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion
warned, however, that a prisoner
who decides to proceed only with
his exhausted claims and deliberately sets aside his unexhausted claims
risks dismissal of any later petitions.
Shortly after the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress

passed the Habeas Act of 1867, providing for appeals as a matter of
right for habeas corpus petitioners
whose petitions for writs have been
denied. See Craemer v. Washington,
168 U.S. 127 (1897). In 1908,
Congress decided to reduce the time
spent on meritless appeals by adopting the requirement that a prisoner
obtain a certificate of probable
cause in order to appeal. The certificate requirement is designed to
reduce the volume of meritless
appeals.
The State of Nevada argues that
there is nothing in Rose supporting
the proposition that a state prisoner
is entitled to multiple dismissals
without prejudice when the prisoner
returns to federal court with new
unexhausted claims despite a previous dismissal without prejudice that
was granted for the purpose of
allowing the petitioner to fully
exhaust his state court remedies.
The State explains that the application of the abuse of the writ doctrine to new claims, regardless of
whether a prior petition was adjudicated on the merits, is consistent
with the principle that a habeas
petitioner may not engage in piecemeal litigation. According to the
State of Nevada, state respondents
should not be required to appear in
federal court time and again only to
have serial federal petitions dismissed for failure to exhaust state
court remedies.
Slack recognizes that, under Rose, a
federal habeas petitioner is presumptively entitled to only a single
adjudication of his claims by the
federal courts and that adjudication
can occur only after the petitioner
has fully exhausted any available
state remedies for all the constitutional claims on which he or she
wants to proceed. Slack asserts that
the requirement that a petitioner
exhaust state remedies contemplates that a federal court's dis-

missal "without prejudice" in order
to permit proceedings in state
courts does not have a preclusive
effect on any later federal habeas
proceedings.
Congress made a number of important changes to the habeas corpus
statutes in 1996 as part of the
AEDPA. Although the requirement
of exhaustion of state remedies was
preserved, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) was
amended to provide a limit on second or successive applications by
prisoners in state custody. Under
this provision, a claim presented in
a second or successive application
that was presented in an earlier
application will be dismissed. 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).
If the claim in a second or successive application was not presented
in a previous application, it will be
dismissed unless the applicant
shows that the claim relies on a
new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court,
which was previously unavailable.
Similarly, Rule 9(b) of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in
the United States District Courts
provides: "A second or successive
petition may be dismissed if the
judge finds that it fails to allege new
or different grounds for relief and
the prior determination was on the
merits or, if new and different
grounds are alleged, the judge finds
that the failure to assert those
grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ." Once a
federal adjudication occurs, the litigation is presumptively over and
the federal adjudication creates the
potential that later proceedings will
constitute an abuse of the writ
under Rule 9(b).
Slack's petitions were filed before
the enactment of the AEDPA, but
he asserts that the definition of a
(Continued on Page 316)
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"second or successive" habeas corpus application is the same under
both AEDPA and pre-AEDPA law.
According to Slack, the Supreme
Court's precedents on exhaustion
and abuse of the writ of habeas corpus have rested on the premise that
a second or successive habeas corpus application is one filed after a
previous federal application has
been adjudicated on the merits.
With respect to the applicability of
the AEDPA to this case, Slack
argues that even if the State had not
waived any issue as to the applicability of the AEDPA by filing to
invoke the Act in the district court
or the court of appeals, the AEDPA
could not apply here because Slack
commenced this action by filing a
petition for writ of habeas corpus
before the enactment of the AEDPA.
According to Slack, the Ninth
Circuit's ruling improperly give
preclusive effect to any claim not in
the prematurely filed petition that
was dismissed "without prejudice."
Slack claims that the Ninth Circuit
has substantially deprived prisoners
of any opportunity to be heard in
federal habeas corpus proceedings
by adopting an ad hoc definition of
the term "second or successive"
that attaches preclusive, or res judicata, effect to a prior "without prejudice" dismissal for lack for complete exhaustion.
Slack argues that the unfairness
inherent in such a rule is demonstrated by this case, in which the
district court applied the Ninth
Circuit's punitive rule to bar Slack
from pursuing his claims simply for
trying to do what the Supreme
Court has contemplated under the
complete exhaustion rule of Rose v.
Lundy. Slack contends that the
Ninth Circuit's treatment of a postexhaustion petition as a second or
successive habeas corpus petition
will introduce substantial uncertain-

ty and unfairness into habeas corpus litigation.
The State of Nevada contends that
Slack's argument ignores the fact
that this case does not deal with the
preclusion of properly exhausted
claims. After one dismissal without
prejudice designed to allow Slack to
exhaust his state court remedies,
the State says that Slack returned to
federal court and improperly raised
five unexhausted claims that had
never appeared in any of his prior
federal or state challenges to his
conviction.
The State stresses that application
of the "abuse of the writ" doctrine
does not require a prior adjudication on the merits. Relying on
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S.
1 (1963), the State argues that the
Supreme Court has made a clear
distinction between, on the one
hand, successive petitions that follow a petition that was determined
on the merits, and on the other
hand, successive petitions that follow a petition that was not determined on the merits. It contends
that the Court's opinion in Sanders
and Rule 9(b) make it clear that a
prior adjudication on the merits is
not necessary for a finding that new
claims raised in a successive petition constitute an abuse of the writ.
Even if the AEDPA applied to this
case, Slack asserts that it would not
change the result. According to
Slack, the certificate of appealability
provisions of the AEDPA retain the
substantive standard of Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), and
that appellate review in this case
remains available under Hohn v.
United States, 118 S.Ct. 1969
(1998). Slack claims that it does not
matter whether the AEDPA governs
this appellate review because the
definition of "second or successive"
petition is the same under AEDPA
and pre-AEDPA law and does not

include petitions filed after previous
petitions have been dismissed without prejudice for exhaustion.
SIGNIFICANCE
In 1998, the Supreme Court held
that a habeas corpus claim that the
defendant was incompetent to be
executed, raised for a second time
after the defendant's first claim was
dismissed without prejudice by the
district court as premature, was not
a "second or successive" application. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,
118 S.Ct. 1618 (1998). The Court
stated that the defendant was entitled to an adjudication of all the
claims presented in his earlier application for habeas corpus. The Court
explained that it has never suggested that a prisoner whose habeas
petition was dismissed for failing to
exhaust state remedies, and who
then exhausted those remedies and
returned to federal court, should be
considered to have filed a successive petition.
Noting that the first petition had
been dismissed without prejudice
for failure to exhaust state remedies, the Court declared that the
defendant had not received an adjudication of his claim. To hold otherwise, the Court said, would mean
that a dismissal of a first habeas
petition for technical procedural
reasons, having nothing to do with
the claims' merits, would bar the
prisoner from ever obtaining federal
habeas review.
A number of courts of appeals have
also held that, where a first petition
is dismissed on exhaustion grounds,
the filing of a later petition is not a
second or successive petition. In
Camaranov. Irvin, 98 F.3d 44 (2d
Cir. 1996), the government argued
that a habeas petitioner was limited
to those claims contained in the initial habeas corpus filing, which had
previously been dismissed without
prejudice. The Second Circuit
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rejected this argument, reasoning
that "because application of the gate
keeping provisions to deny a resubmitted petition in cases such as this
would effectively preclude any
habeas review, such a holding would
conflict with the doctrine of writ
abuse." See also Dickinson v.
Maine, 101 F.3d 791 (1st Cir. 1996);
Christy v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 208
(3d Cir. 1997); In re Gasery, 116
F.3d 1051, 1052 (5th Cir. 1997);
Woods v. Whitley, 933 F.2d 321, 322
n.1 (5th Cir. 1991); Carlson v.
Pitcher, 137 F.3d 416 (6th Cir.
1998); Benton v. Washington, 106
F.3d 162, 164 (7th Cir. 1996);
Dellenbach v. Hanks, 75 F.3d 820,
822 (7th Cir. 1996); Hill v.
Lockhart, 894 F.2d 1009, 1010 (8th
Cir. 1990); McWilliams v. State of
Colorado, 121 F.3d 573, 575 (10th
Cir. 1997).
In Farmerv. McDaniel, 98 F.3d
1548 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
520 U.S. 1188 (1997), the Ninth
Circuit, relying on Rule 9(b), held
that a prior adjudication on the
merits was not a prerequisite to the
application of the doctrine of abuse
of the writ. It pointed out that Rule
9(b) appears to contemplate two
possibilities for dismissal of a second or successive petition. The first
occurs when a judge finds that the
petition does not allege new or different grounds and that the prior
determination was on the merits.
The second arises when new and
different grounds are alleged and
the judge finds that the petitioner's
failure to assert them in a prior petition was an abuse of the writ. The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that Rule
9(b) distinguishes between "same
ground" and "new and different
ground" petitions and that a court
may dismiss a "new and different
ground" petition if the government
shows there has been an abuse of
the writ.
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The use of federal habeas corpus for
state prisoners has long been a controversial subject even though prisoners are successful in no more
than 4 percent of the cases. More
than 100 years ago there were
protests against "the prostitution of
the writ of habeas corpus under
which the decisions of the state
courts are subjected to the superintendency of the Federal judges."
Note, FederalAbuses of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, 25 Am.L.Rev. 149,
153 (1898). In 1954, the attorneys
general of 41 states attempted to
have the habeas corpus statute,
insofar as it applies to state prisoners, declared unconstitutional.
United States ex rel. Elliot v.
Hendricks, 213 F.2d 922 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 851 (1954).
In 1954, the Judicial Conference of
the United States also unsuccessfully proposed an amendment to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 that would have virtually ended federal habeas corpus for
state prisoners.
If the Supreme Court upholds the
Ninth Circuit's decision in this case,
it will be more difficult for state
prisoners to challenge their convictions in federal court. In particular,
such a decision would greatly
restrict the ability of state prisoners
to bring successive petitions for
habeas corpus alleging new grounds
even if their earlier petitions had
not been decided on the merits. On
the other hand, a reversal of the
Ninth Circuit will make it easier
for state prisoners to have a
federal court decide whether their
federal constitutional rights had
been violated.
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ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For Antonio T. Slack (Michael
Pescetta, Assistant Federal Public
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For E.K. McDaniel, Warden (David
F. Sarnowski, Chief Deputy Attorney
General, State of Nevada (775) 6841265)
AMICUS BRIEFS (AS OF
FEB. 25)
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National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers and the Federal
Defenders Association (Edward M.
Chikofsky (212) 289-1062)
The Rutherford Institute (John
W. Whitehead (804) 978-3888)
In Support of E.K. McDaniel,
Warden
States of California, Alabama,
Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington
(A. Scott Hayward (213) 897-2392)

